This paper analyses the impact of the Indian reforms of the early 1990s on exports and employment by using indicators of competitiveness and comparative advantage. These indicators are unit cost ratios, which differ by using domestic prices, international or export prices and shadow prices. They are broken down into cost components which show the sources of competitiveness or the lack of it, such as productivity or price and cost distortions. The changes in competitiveness following the reforms are then used to examine whether the export and employment performance of the manufacturing industries can be attributed to the reform-induced cost changes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The reforms of the Indian economic system in the early 1990s have been wide-ranging in terms of the policy areas and sectors targeted. In this paper we focus on the large-scale manufacturing sector as recorded by the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). The policy areas that affect this sector most strongly, by creating incentives and disincentives, are the policies regulating imports and exports, the exchange rate and the interest rate, as well as changes in the regulatory framework directed towards industries. Unfortunately not all of these reform components can be quantified. Therefore, it is difficult to attribute unambiguously the changes in the growth of the value added, employment and exports to changes of specific policy variables. An attempt is made, however, to isolate some of the observable changes and to relate them statistically to the measurable changes in policy variables.
Our approach is to use the available quantitative evidence of changes in trade policy (rates of protection), in exchange rate policy (the real exchange rate) and in interest rate policy (the market and shadow rates of interest), together with output and cost data from ASI, during the study period (1987/88 to 1997/98) , and to relate observable changes in competitiveness, comparative advantage, exports and other variables to the changes of these policy variables. The definition of the study period as well as the choice of manufacturing as representative of the modern sector were dictated by the availability of the data for the chosen method of analysis.
The paper enables one to draw lessons from India's experience with reforms that may be of interest to other late-reforming countries. Of particular interest may be India's gradualist approach to trade and financial liberalization, as well as the sequencing of internal and external reforms. Similar approaches have been chosen by several countries in the Asian and Pacific region.
The next section reviews the main reform components, focusing on industrial protection, the exchange rate and the cost of capital. The third section explains the method of analysis, in particular the measurement of competitiveness and comparative advantage. In the fourth section we discuss the changes in competitiveness and comparative advantage, using unit cost ratios, which are the core of the current approach. The export performance of industries and its determinants are examined in section five and the employment record of the sector in section six. The conclusion summarizes the study and offers some policy recommendations.
II. REFORM INCIDENCE: A VIEW FROM THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR
There is an ongoing debate in the literature (as well as in political circles) as to whether the recent acceleration of economic growth in India can be attributed to the reforms implemented in the pre-1991 era and if the reform movement as a whole actually started with those initial steps taken throughout the 1980s. Rodrik (2002) argued that tentative measures taken under the Rajiv Ghandi Government in the 1980s led to disproportionately high growth, while the reforms undertaken in and after 1991 had a far smaller impact with respect to GDP growth. Panagariya (2004) refuted this argument, arguing in favour of the 1990s reforms by stating: "Growth during the 1980s was fragile, highly variable from year to year, and unsustainable. In contrast, once the 1991 reforms took root, growth became less variable and more sustainable with even a slight upward shift in the mean growth rate" (Panagariya, 2004, p. 5 ).
Panagariya went on to argue that, despite the limitations of the 1980s reforms in terms of their scope and vision, they differed markedly from the "isolated and sporadic" liberalization measures implemented throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and can therefore be seen as forerunners to more "systematic and systemic" reforms of the 1990s. In providing this argument, Panagariya drew on support from Ahluwalia (2002, p. 67) , who stated that "while the growth record in the 1990s was only slightly better than that in the 1980s, the 1980s growth was unsustainable, fuelled by a build-up of external debt that culminated in the crisis of 1991". Srinivasan and Tendulkar (2003) provided an export-oriented view of the reforms undertaken in the 1980s by stating that the increase in Indian exports over the 1980s reform era was due (mostly) to an exchange rate depreciation attributed more to exogenous forces than to "explicit policy reforms aimed at reducing the trade barrier".
We concentrate on the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 1991 crisis and their subsequent effects on the performance of the manufacturing sector. First, we provide evidence of the reform incidence as it affects the industrial sector. In the area of trade and industrial policies we present estimates of the nominal rates of protection, both from earlier studies and our own estimates, as well as their changes during the study period. Similar observations are then made about foreign exchange and interest rate policies.
Trade and industrial policy reforms
In the area of trade and industrial policies, the reforms included first the elimination of quantitative restrictions, which had formerly affected most industries. However, their elimination was not completed until 2001. This policy change meant that protection shifted entirely, albeit gradually, to import tariffs. The second important change was the reduction of the tariff rates and the resulting change in the structure of protection. Both policy interventions were accompanied by a host of other changes in the regulatory framework and in particular the industrial licensing regime. Panagariya (2004) provided us with a more detailed perspective on the incidence of tariff reductions undertaken after the June 1991 crisis. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) (1998), as surveyed by him, the import-weighted average tariff rate stood at 87 per cent throughout the 1990-1991 period, with the highest reaching 355 per cent. Tariff reform was undertaken through effective reductions in the number of tariff bands and a consistent compression of the top tariff rate falling to 85 per cent in the 1993-1994 period, 50 per cent in the 1995-1996 period and finally 25 per cent in the 2003-2004 period.
As far as regulatory policies for the manufacturing sector are concerned, Panagariya (2004) outlined the effectiveness with which the July 1991 "Statement of Industrial Policy" sought to (and did) eliminate investment licensing and entry restrictions on companies under the purview of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act. Throughout the 1990s reform period and following the July 1991 "Statement of Industrial Policy", all investment licensing (irrespective of amount) was abolished across all sectors except 18 (outlined in annex II of the policy statement) which were later reduced to five, the public sector monopoly was limited to eight sectors (listed in annex I of the policy statement and selected according to security and strategic considerations), and pre-entry inspection of investment decisions of MRTP companies, along with provisions relating to mergers, takeovers and amalgamations, was repealed.
The level and structure of protection are of particular importance in the present study of competitiveness, since the unit cost ratios used for measuring competitiveness depend crucially on the difference between domestic and international prices. It is therefore important to establish whether the true nominal rates of protection (NRPs) are well approximated by the frequently used tariff-based NRPs.
In order to measure actual protection, i.e. the combined effect of the tariff, of quantitative restrictions, exemptions and other factors on prices, it would be necessary to compare the domestic ex-factory prices with the corresponding free-trade or border prices. This is a very difficult task and has been undertaken systematically only in a few countries and by a few Governments or expert agencies.
1 In an earlier version of this paper we had used the tariff-based NRPs and effective rates of protection (ERPs) from the National Council of Applied and Economic Research (1998) , but after discussions with several Indian economists, 2 it was concluded that these rates considerably overstate the actual level of protection. The phenomenon known as "water in the tariff" is likely to result from factors such as exemptions and underinvoicing, as well as from domestic price competition. It has apparently grown in importance since the reforms of the early
1
The World Bank has undertaken studies of nominal and effective rates of protection based on price controls in various countries in the 1970s and 1980s. One of the few countries, in which government agencies undertook such studies is Mexico (ten Kate, 1992).
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1990s. In order to get closer towards price-based NRPs, we have adopted, for 1987/88, the collection rates computed by Nouroz (2001) . Collection rates are obtained by dividing the tariff revenue by the value of imports. They capture only exemptions, which are part of the "water in the tariff", but not the effects of smuggling and domestic price competition. They are not a perfect substitute for true and price-based rates of protection, but provide, in the presence of tariff redundancy, a somewhat more realistic measure of protection than the tariff-based rates. For 1997/98, the collection rates are replaced here by estimates based on the collection rates for 1987/88 and on a projection using Indian and international wholesale price indices. According to this procedure, even the collection rates for 1997/98 seem to overstate the margin between Indian and international industry prices, as Indian wholesale prices have increased less (annually by 8.7 per cent) than the corresponding international prices expressed in rupees (12.6 per cent), where most of the international price margin is attributable to the exchange rate (9.9 per cent). This was observed by comparing Indian industry wholesale prices with international (Canadian) industry wholesale prices. This procedure leads to NRP estimates for 1997/98 that are below the collection rates for 1997/98 and suggest that even in 1987/88 the collection rates may have overstated the true margin of Indian over international prices. The estimates adopted for the present study and shown in table 1 are the average between the wholesale price-based projections described above and the collection rates, after adjustment for the relative importance of exports.
Based on this approach, the following picture emerges of the structure of protection and its changes between 1987/88 and 1997/98. As table 1 shows, in comparing columns 3 and 6, the average protection (NRP) of manufacturing as a whole declined from 42 to 10 per cent. The standard deviation of NRPs was reduced from 0.26 to 0.10. The reduction of nominal protection was most dramatic for the chemical (-67 per cent); rubber, plastics, petrol and coal products (-59 per cent); wool and silk textiles (-49 per cent) and basic metal (-48 per cent) industries. Only one industry, beverages and tobacco products, experienced increasing protection, which was most likely the consequence of changes in the incidence of tariff exemptions.
Although it is common to measure the level of protection by tariff-based NRPs and ERPs, this is not a satisfactory approach when for various reasons the law of one price may not hold. Situations in which this happens are the aftermath of strong currency realignments, or when strong domestic competition makes the existing tariff structure redundant. In the case of the present study, it is of great importance to use realistic NRPs because they are an important input in the analysis of competitiveness and comparative advantage.
Foreign exchange policy
Perhaps the most powerful policy instrument with regard to the incentive regime is the exchange rate. Countries adhering to a fixed exchange rate regime have a tendency to function with a misaligned exchange rate. Fixed exchange rates become misaligned when the fixed rate is not periodically adjusted to the differential between domestic and foreign rates of inflation. Trade liberalization often goes in tandem with liberalization of the exchange rate, which implies letting the price of foreign currencies be determined by supply and demand. The Indian reforms of 1991 and consecutive years also included such a re-alignment of the rupee. (Panagariya, 2004) . Within one year the exchange rate was unified.
The degree of misalignment can be computed using the real exchange rate. In other words, rather than observing a shadow exchange rate and the divergence of the market rate from the shadow rate, one infers the degree of misalignment by observing domestic and foreign price changes, by computing the real exchange rate over time and by identifying a base year in which the misalignment was known to be minimal.
The shadow exchange rate and the implicit rate of currency overvaluation are estimated here using this method based on the real exchange rate. It is assumed that the year 1994, in which the exchange rate was unified and the rupee was made fully convertible on the trade account, was a year of minimal misalignment; it is taken as the benchmark year, in which the real exchange rate index equals 100. The real exchange rate depreciated from 35 to 48 per cent between 1987/88 and 1994, depending on which price index is chosen.
3 Based on the assumption of zero misalignment from 1994 onwards, an estimate of 40 per cent overvaluation is used for 1987/88 and zero overvaluation for 1997/98.
One could argue that this rate may overstate the real overvaluation because the exchange rate may have overshot its target in 1994 and may have been undervalued after several years of strong nominal depreciation. This is unlikely, however, because the rupee continued to depreciate slightly in real terms in 1995; it appreciated somewhat in 1996, but depreciated again in 1997 and 1998, returning to its benchmark value of 100 in 1998. The elimination of currency overvaluation implies that Indian industries became more competitive as a result of this aspect of external policy reform. Using wholesale prices, for which the inflation differential is largest, the real exchange rate depreciated by 32 per cent, while using the GDP deflator leads to real depreciation of 53 per cent. Using consumer prices, the real depreciation was 40 per cent. The exchange rate used in this calculation is the one of rupees per SDR, and the foreign price indices relate to the industrial country aggregate, as reported by IMF, International Finance Statisics, current issues.
The price of capital and foreign investment
One of the main targets of policy reform is the price of capital and the access to foreign capital markets. To the extent that the capital account is liberated, the price of capital is increasingly determined by international interest rates, such as LIBOR. Capital account liberalization is usually the last step in financial reforms. In the earlier stages of reform, the price of capital remains a domestic variable and tends to be influenced mainly by the state of the financial sector, the degree of financial repression and the interest rate policies of Governments.
India's reforms have included financial reforms, which have had the double effect of reducing the domestic cost of capital and opening the country to foreign capital inflows. The domestic price of capital is measured here by the lending rate, which was lowered from 16.5 per cent in 1987/88 to 13.8 per cent in 1997/98. The shadow price of capital is computed here as LIBOR adjusted for the inflation differential between India and countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. It remained fairly stable at about 11 per cent (11.5 per cent in 1987/88 and 11.3 per cent in 1997/98). Therefore, the interest rate premium paid by Indian investors has been reduced by 2.5 per cent; this reduction may be considered as an indicator of modest financial liberalization.
More important than the cost of capital, however, may be the influx of foreign investment, which also occurred under the reforms. Its potentially greater importance stems from the fact that it comes bundled with foreign technology whenever it is in the form of direct and long-term investment. In 1987/88 foreign direct investment was literally non-existent in India, but it started to flow in by 1991 and reached a total of about three billion dollars in 1997/98. Unfortunately, we have no information on the amount of foreign direct investment received by each industry in the manufacturing sector.
The 1991 reform package called for abolishing the 40 per cent threshold on foreign direct investment, and empowered the Reserve Bank of India to approve equity investments of up to 51 per cent in 34 industries through the development of an automatic approval concept (Panagariya, 2004) . 
III. METHOD OF ANALYSIS AND THE DATA USED
The reduction of protection observed during the study period has clearly had the effect of increasing competition from foreign imports, which must have induced firms to cut costs. Such cost reductions could have taken a number of forms: the shedding of redundant workers (to the extent possible under existing laws); adopting new production processes, which usually require new investments; and varying the composition and sources of intermediate inputs. Successful cost reductions should then result in greater competitiveness, both in the domestic market, vis-à-vis imports, and in export markets. Given the importance of competitiveness and comparative advantage in the process of adjustment to the reforms, the measurement of these attributes using three unit cost ratios is central in the present study. It is worth tracing the reform impact from its incidence in terms of protection to the changes in costs and further to the changes in export and employment performance.
The measurement of competitiveness
Competitiveness is measured here by three unit cost ratios developed and applied in several earlier studies (Siggel and Ssemogerere, 2004; Cockburn and others, 1999) , including one on India in the 1980s (Siggel, 2001) . 5 The first ratio, UCd, which we consider to be an indicator of domestic competitiveness, is the ratio of the total costs to the output value, both measured in domestic, possibly distorted, prices. Since unit costs differ from the domestic price only by excess profits, this indicator is simply a measure of profitability in the protected domestic market. It differs, however, slightly from the rate of return, because own capital enters into the unit costs with its opportunity costs at market prices.
The second unit cost ratio, UCx, is an indicator of export competitiveness. It divides the total costs at domestic prices by the free-trade value of output. This indicator assumes that the total output is destined for the export market, which in reality is rarely the case. Therefore, UCx tends to be significantly larger than 1 for many industries.
The third unit cost ratio, UCs, is an indicator of comparative advantage. It divides the total cost in shadow prices by the shadow value of output. The indicator is similar to the domestic resource cost (DRC) ratio, which is well known in the literature. UCs, however, measures full costs, whereas the DRC ratio, applied at the firm or industry level, uses the value added and thereby ignores the contribution
5
The method is briefly explained in the annex.
of intermediate inputs to comparative advantage. The computation of the three indicators is further explained in the annex.
Data sources and limitations
While the data on protection originate from various sources, in particular Nouroz (2001) , the revenue, cost and employment data are from ASI, supplemented by price and exchange rate data from the International Financial Statistics of IMF as well as the author's computations of shadow prices. The export data are taken from a World Bank data bank (Trade and Production Database, 3-digit level). Some commentators of the present study have cast doubt on the validity of the ASI data, arguing that the coverage of this data source is increasingly restrictive. That may be so, but we have no clear understanding of the magnitude of the potential inaccuracy. The most serious limitation in the present method of analysis, however, is the absence of price comparisons between Indian prices and international prices, as measured by true NRPs and discussed in section II.
IV. CHANGES IN COMPETITIVENESS AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
The changes in unit costs are reported here in the same order as the indicators were presented previously, i.e. with increasing dependence on assumptions. The first indicator, UCd, relies almost exclusively on the data published by ASI; only the opportunity cost of capital is added. The indicators UCx and UCs rely on additional assumptions about true protection and shadow prices. The indicator UCx is also used for decomposition into price and real cost effects. Finally, the analysis of distortions reveals the importance of existing obstacles to competitiveness.
Increased profitability
Under trade liberalization and globalization, industries are expected to become less profitable in the short run because their protective price margin on output shrinks and is usually more important than the one on traded intermediate inputs. However, when the reduction of import restrictions is accompanied by real currency depreciation, the combined outcome can be the opposite. This is the situation we observe in Indian manufacturing during the study period. The real depreciation of the exchange rate, which eliminated the substantial overvaluation of the 1980s, had the consequence of raising the price of tradable products, which counteracted the price-reducing effect of cutting the tariff. The unit cost ratio in terms of domestic prices (UCd) declined slightly from an average of 0.9919 in 1987/88 to 0.9842 in 1997/98. It must be remembered that this indicator essentially measures the profitability of industries but differs from the profit rate as it includes the opportunity cost of own capital within the cost of capital. The condition UCd <1 is equivalent to a profit rate exceeding the market interest rate. Table 2 shows that the most profitable industry has been, and still is, the beverage and tobacco industry, followed by basic metals and machinery. This may be due to relatively high protection, but as shown later, for the beverages and tobacco industry, that cannot be the cause. The least profitable industry in 1987/88 was the basic metals industry, but it has dramatically reversed its position to become the second most profitable one in 1997/98. The cotton textile branch registered losses and was the least profitable industry in 1997/98. This may be the result of strong competition in export markets. 
Export competitiveness
International or export competitiveness is interpreted here as the situation where full unit costs in terms of domestic prices are inferior to the prices on the international market. This condition is reflected by a unit cost ratio (UCx) inferior to 1, as this index divides the total unit cost in market prices by the border or free trade price. This indicator is shown in table 3, which also ranks the industries based on this indicator.
The UCx values in table 3 suggest that in the manufacturing sector as a whole export competitiveness has increased significantly, by about 40 per cent, but even in 1997/98 unit costs still exceeded free-trade prices by about 6 per cent, on average. Industries also have become more uniform in terms of export competitiveness, since the standard deviation has declined from 25.4 to 8.3 per cent. In spite of this gain in international competitiveness by 1997/98, in the majority of industries costs exceeded the value of output at global prices. This reflects the fact that the proportion of exports in the total output is still low in most industries and most industries still depend on protection in the domestic market.
The most export-competitive industries in 1997/98 were, aside from the beverages and tobacco products industry, the jute and hemp products, food products and leather products industries. The "rising stars" were the food products; rubber, plastics petroleum and coal products; and chemicals industries. Surprisingly, the garment industry ranks only fifth in terms of export competitiveness. This finding is not easily reconciled with the industry's export success. Possibly, the collection NRP overstates the actual domestic/foreign price differential, so that the computed international value of output is downward biased, implying an upward bias for the unit cost ratio.
Comparative advantage
The expected effect of the reforms on unit costs at shadow prices is complex and consists of the elements described below. First, some firms that cannot compete in the more open environment are likely to disappear. Those that survive must cut their costs by reducing inputs per unit of output. Both of these effects should lead to a reduction in unit costs.
Second, price adjustments are also likely to take place. Expanding industries are likely to increase their demand for intermediate inputs, capital and labour, which may lead to certain cost increases. With accelerating industrial growth, unit cost increases are possible; however, just which of the opposing effects dominates is not obvious a priori. Third, when the currency is overvalued the shadow prices of all tradable inputs and outputs exceed their market value so that the unit cost ratio at shadow prices tends to be low, as observed in 1987/88. When currency overvaluation vanishes, as we assume was the case in the early 1990s, the shadow value of the tradable output no longer exceeds its market value, so that the unit cost ratio at shadow prices tends to be higher. This effect of the devaluation of an overvalued currency on prices is well known and can, at least temporarily, lead to negative nominal rates of protection. Without price comparisons, however, and when tariff-based NRPs or collection rate-based NRPs are used, the unit cost ratios at shadow prices may easily overstate true unit costs and thereby understate comparative advantage. This is demonstrated in a simple numerical example. Let UCd equal 1 in both periods (i.e. normal rate of return), let the currency be overvalued by 40 per cent in period 1 and well aligned in period 2, and let NRP be diminished from 40 per cent in period 1 to 10 per cent in period 2. The shadow value of output declines from 100 to 91, which leads to an increase in unit costs at shadow prices. This follows because the same effect on the cost side is much smaller than for the output value, as tradable inputs are only a fraction of total costs.
As table 4 suggests, the industry average of unit costs in terms of shadow prices has increased from 0.98 to 1.02 during the study period. At the surface, this means that the manufacturing industries on average would have lost some of their comparative cost advantage. The argument presented above, however, explains the phenomenon. The slight increase in the average unit cost ratio also hides the fact that several industries gained in terms of comparative advantage, such as garments (26), leather goods (29), chemicals (31), basic metals (33) and other manufactures (38). Declining industries in terms of comparative advantage seem to be wood products (27), metal products (34), rubber, plastics, petroleum and coal products (30), as well as non-metallic minerals (32).
The ranking of industries according to unit costs at shadow prices is similar to that of export competitiveness. This follows from the fact that in the absence of currency misalignment the two indicators are very similar. Their only difference lies in the shadow prices of unskilled labour and of capital, which does not strongly The changing structure of the manufacturing sector can be seen in table 5, where the relative size of each industry is shown in terms of value added and the changes in relative size (proportion of total sector value added) are identified by increasing or decreasing arrows. Although the growth rate of value added is most strongly correlated with UCd (-0.46), which is a measure of profitability, the correlation of value added growth rates with UCx (-0.34) and UCs (-0.26) also have the expected sign, indicating an expansion of export-competitive industries and a slight tendency for growth to favour those industries with a comparative advantage. The highest annual growth rates in terms of real value added were experienced by the following industries: rubber, plastics, petroleum and coal products (19.8 per cent), garments (14.1 per cent), basic metals (11.8 per cent), leather products (11.3 per cent) and transport equipment (9.9 per cent). Chemicals and wood products on the other hand registered a slight decline in terms of real value added.
Distortion analysis
One of the advantages of the present method for measuring unit costs at three different levels, namely domestic prices, international prices and shadow prices, is the ability to isolate those cost effects that are attributable to policy-induced price distortions. The numerical difference between UCx and UCs, for instance, is the sum of all factors that influence total costs and which influence the output value at international prices. Since export competitiveness is measured here at costs that exclude import duties on intermediate inputs, assuming the duty draw-back available to exporters, this cost distortion is not part of the difference between UCx and UCs; it would raise the average UCx from 1.05 to 1.10. The difference between UCx and UCs, which is an average of 3.3 per cent for total manufacturing in 1997/98, has essentially two components: the cost of credit and the cost of labour. The cost of credit adds about 2.3 per cent on average to the unit cost at export prices. It is caused by the fact that the average lending rate (13.8 per cent) exceeds the shadow price of capital (11.3 per cent). In addition, the rate of interest actually paid by some industries substantially exceeds the average lending rate. In the area of labour payments the actual cost also exceeds the shadow cost of labour owing to a discrepancy between the wages of unskilled workers and their shadow wages, which are taken to correspond to informal-sector wages. This cost differential excludes the cost imposed by the rigidity of labour legislation, for which we have not found any data or estimates. Since the total of these cost differentials is positive (i.e. UCx > UCs), this means that in most industries export competitiveness is hampered by the distortions in the capital and labour costs.
Price effects versus real cost effects
The impact of various policy reforms on manufacturing unit costs can be analysed as a combination of two kinds of change, a price effect and a real cost effect. First, the elimination or reduction of price distortions can be seen as a direct and immediate consequence of the combined trade reform and currency realignment. This does not mean that prices adjust instantaneously, but for analytical purposes we assume that the price adjustment occurs in the short run. The cost adjustments by way of changing inputs per unit of output are less predictable and may take more time. They depend on entrepreneurial decisions, whereas the price effect measures the incidence of policy changes.
The lowering of trade barriers diminishes the prices of tradable output and inputs. On the other hand, currency depreciation raises the values of tradable outputs and inputs. The combined effect of trade liberalization and currency depreciation may be positive or negative, depending on whether the tariff reduction or the depreciation dominates. Inputs and costs are less affected than output because part of the input cost is non-traded (non-traded intermediate inputs and value-added). Therefore, the unit cost ratios, which divide total costs by output value, tend to rise as long as the reduction of the protection exceeds the effect of the real currency depreciation. The analysis of the data from Indian manufacturing during the period from 1987/88 to 1997/98 shows the opposite outcome: the policy impact on unit costs (price effect) has been a substantial decline, because the currency depreciation was stronger than the reduction of protection as measured by NRP. This is demonstrated in table 6. Table 6 shows the price and real cost effects at the level of costs per unit of export value (UCx). The unit cost ratios UCx' in the third column are based on the output and cost data for 1987/88 but the prices in 1997/98, i.e. after the policy changes had taken their full effect on prices but before the input and output quantities were adjusted. The price effect is computed as the difference between UCx' and UCx87/88 and the real cost effect is the difference between UCx97/98 and UCx'. For the total manufacturing sector the price effect on unit costs at international prices is a reduction of 41 per cent. This may be unexpected as trade liberalization is usually associated with shrinking profit margins due to increased competition in domestic markets. Here, however, we measure the impact in export markets, i.e. excluding tariff protection on the output side, and in the context of substantial currency depreciation. This means that the combined effect of currency realignment and trade liberalization has been to increase output prices more strongly than the manufacturing costs. It means that exporting was rendered more profitable by the combined impact of tariff cuts and currency depreciation.
The effect of cost-cutting on unit costs by way of input and output adjustments has been minimal on average for the manufacturing sector, as the last column in table 6 suggests. This result also can be explained in the same way as the price effect since it is computed as residual, i.e. by deducting the unit cost in 1997/98 from the UCx' value. To the extent that the price effect tends to be overstated, the real cost effect tends to be understated. The effect is not insignificant for single industries and its sign alternates. It is likely, however, that the present method of measuring the two effects overstates the price effect to the detriment of the real cost effect.
The real cost effect deserves further attention because it results from four different kinds of action. When redundant workers are dismissed, labour productivity increases. When capital equipment is renewed, this can lead to increased or decreased capital productivity, depending on the capital and investment values. Intermediate input reductions are also important, especially energy savings, as they are also a reflection of rationalization. Non-tradable intermediate inputs are of particular interest here because they include service contracts with external agents and may capture the subcontracting and outsourcing phenomena.
As table 7 shows, the real cost effect differs for the four types of inputs. While tradable inputs and labour costs decline in most industries and for the sector as a whole, by 1.8 and 2.0 per cent, respectively, non-traded inputs and capital costs are increased; capital costs are increased by 1.6 per cent and non-traded inputs more strongly by 7.0 per cent. While some of these cost changes may be explained by substitution between capital and labour and some traded and non-traded inputs, they may also reflect the substitution of direct labour by contract labour. This observation supports the hypothesis that the decline in labour costs can at least partially be explained by increasing service contracts, which are included in the non-traded input category. The phenomenon of outsourcing has been one of the ways that Indian industries cope with the rigidities of labour legislation. It is possible that the simultaneous decline in labour costs and the increase in service contracts is evidence of increased outsourcing in the aftermath of the Indian reforms. The industries that are known to have used outsourcing extensively are the textile industries (23 to 26); however, other industries may have a similar record. More research at the industry level is required to confirm this hypothesis. 
V. MANUFACTURING EXPORTS AND THEIR CHANGES
Manufacturing exports have grown substantially during the study period. Annual average growth amounted to 14 per cent in United States dollar terms and 11 per cent in real terms. This performance is superior to the growth in the preceding 10-year period. Table 8 shows the growth performance of 15 two-digitlevel industries. The number is reduced from the earlier used number of 17 because in the export data the cotton, wool, silk and synthetic textile products, as well as jute and hemp-based products, are aggregated into a single textile industry, although separate from the clothing industry. The growth in exports is also evident at the level of export/output ratios, which are shown to have increased in 11 out of 16 industries (see table 9); the average export/output ratio for the whole sector has increased from 9.7 to 14.3 per cent.
The changing structure of exports
The export performance varies substantially between the industries, as shown in table 8 by the annual average growth rates during the study period. The table suggests that the non-metallic mineral (32) and basic metal (33) industries have experienced the strongest export growth in terms of percentage growth rates. The most important export industries, however, remain the group of other manufactures (38), which includes jewellery, textiles (23, 24 and 25), food products (20-21) and the clothing industry (26). The growth rates in the third column refer to export values in the fourth column, which are given in current United States dollars. The last column of table 8 shows the main products exported.
Determinants of export growth
Export expansion may result from a number of factors, some of which are likely a consequence of the reforms. When trade liberalization, as reflected by declining rates of protection, increases foreign competition and when competitive pressure forces the producers to lower their production costs, their competitiveness increases. The reduction in production costs may affect intermediate inputs as well as labour and capital. The cost prices of traded intermediate inputs decline when the tariff on traded inputs is reduced and to the extent that industries are not yet benefiting from duty drawbacks. The quantities of intermediate inputs may also be reduced and, as we saw previously, they have declined for tradables, but increased for non-tradables. As to the primary inputs, labour inputs may decline to the extent that labour laws allow firms to reduce employment. However, as argued previously, Indian firms seem to have found ways to reduce labour costs by subcontracting. Capital costs can be reduced by increasing the utilization rate of existing capital stocks. Firms may also change their technology through new investments, which is most likely when industries have benefited from foreign investment. The inflow of foreign direct investment may be an important determinant of export expansion, but the lack of relevant data limits the analysis at this point.
Another source of export expansion may be the reduction of export restrictions, especially licensing. Unfortunately we do not possess enough quantitative evidence to examine this potential explanation of export success. Export incentives in the form of duty draw-back for imported inputs are taken into account in the unit cost ratios discussed previously. On the other hand, corporate income tax remissions are not taken into account, because the data are lacking in this regard. Further changes that may have encouraged exports are institutional changes, such as privatization and hardened budgets in the case of State-owned enterprises. Here again we miss the quantitative evidence necessary to analyse this type of reform-related factor.
Given that some, if not most, of the relevant export incentives should be reflected by unit costs, we examine here to what extent export growth is related to the three unit cost indicators reflecting domestic and international competitiveness, as well as comparative advantage. Since the sample of 16 industries is too small to do serious econometric analysis, we just examine the degree of correlation between exports and export growth on the one hand and the unit cost ratios, rates of protection, capital intensity and labour productivity on the other. The regression coefficients are shown in table 10. According to equations 1 and 4, the level of exports and their rates of increase are negatively correlated with the level and rate of change of nominal protection; their correlation coefficient is on the order of -0.5. This outcome, although not unexpected, may be partially attributed to the realignment (depreciation) of the rupee. This effect is captured by the unit cost ratio at shadow prices (UCs), which is shown in equation 3; it provides the strongest explanation of export performance. Exports are highest in those industries which exhibit the greatest comparative cost advantage. The growth in exports is also strongly correlated with the decline in unit costs at shadow prices, i.e. enhanced comparative advantage and export growth are closely related. Export competitiveness and its change are also correlated with exports and export growth, but in a slightly less significant way. This can be explained by the fact that export competitiveness is still lagging behind comparative advantage due to the distortion factors discussed previously, especially for the cost of credit and the cost of labour.
Finally, export performance was also examined with respect to capital intensity and labour productivity. While the correlation between exports and capital intensity, as well as between exports and labour productivity, is negative (see equations 7 and 8), indicating that exports tend to be relatively labour intensive, the growth in labour productivity is positively, although weakly, correlated with export growth (see equation 9). This suggests, although statistically weakly, that in spite of the existing labour laws, the industries whose exports were growing seem to have reduced their labour costs and increased their labour productivity.
VI. EMPLOYMENT GROWTH UNDER THE REFORMS
Employment growth is a crucial aspect of this investigation because of its role with regard to income growth and poverty alleviation, which are the ultimate goals of the policy reforms. Employment growth implies income growth, but it also raises costs and thereby diminishes competitiveness, which in turn may reduce exports and growth. Under trade liberalization and globalization, the short-run impact is usually employment reduction, but the long-run effect is expected to be employment growth through raised productivity and competitiveness. Since this study compared two points in time over a 10-year period, where the main policy changes fall into the first half of the period, we expect to observe more of the longer-run effects. The questions of interest are then (a) whether there is substantive evidence of employment growth and (b) whether employment growth is driven by exports.
Employment versus productivity and export growth
As table 11 shows, employment in manufacturing has grown at an average annual rate of 2.24 per cent over the study period. The growth rate was particularly high in the rubber, plastic, petroleum and coal industry (13.2 per cent), as well as in the clothing industry (10.5 per cent). It was particularly low in chemicals (4.6 per cent), as well as in cotton textiles (0.3 per cent), non-metallic minerals (0.46 per cent), wood products (0.69 per cent), basic metals (0.77 per cent) and jute and hemp textiles (0.96 per cent). Although some industries, the exports of which have grown most strongly in value terms, have also experienced strong employment growth, for instance the clothing industry (10.5 per cent) and other manufactures (6.5 per cent), the whole manufacturing sector exhibits a negative correlation between employment growth and export growth, as seen in the following regression:
Dependent variable Independent variable Coefficient t-ratio R dE/E dX/X -0.0044 -2.49 -0.54
The observation that strong export growth tends to coincide with weak employment growth or employment reduction is taken as evidence of ongoing adjustment. In other words, industries with expanding exports seem to be adjusting downwards their labour intensity. This is consistent with the previous observation that export growth is positively correlated with labour productivity. The observation also leads to the conclusion that employment growth is not yet driven by export growth but by domestic demand, although exports increasingly seem to play the role of a driving force.
The growth of labour productivity shown in table 11 occurred most strongly in the basic metals, wool and silk textiles and transport equipment industries, which were not among the main exporters, with the possible exception of wool and silk textiles. It is possible that they were still in the adjustment process during the study period and that their productivity growth and unit cost decline prepared them to become important exporters in the future. This conjecture is confirmed by the high export growth rates, albeit from a small base, of basic metals (17.1 per cent) and transport equipment (12.7 per cent).
A similar picture arises from observing the potential relationship between employment growth and productivity growth (R = -0.31), as well as changes in competitiveness. Industries with the largest employment gains were not the ones whose output grew even faster and thereby raised their labour productivity. Also there is no significant correlation between employment growth and unit cost reduction. Since the growth of labour productivity was substantial, over 8 per cent real as an annual average, these observations imply that employment growth was driven more by general demand expansion than by gains in competitiveness and exports.
It follows from the evidence presented above that during the study period total employment in manufacturing did not shrink, as could have been expected under competitive pressure, which resulted from the substantive decline of protection and globalization. Instead, it expanded at a rate of 2.2 per cent, with some industries generating more than or close to 10 per cent employment growth. This means that, in spite of the painful adjustments required by trade liberalization and globalization, the manufacturing sector contributed positively to the growth of income and employment.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Indian experience with economic reforms is interesting in its own right, but also for other late reforming countries. The present research has focused on the reform impact on manufacturing industries. We found first that the level and structure of protection was drastically changed by the reforms and that the traditional way of measuring protection by use of tariffs may no longer be valid due to widespread tariff redundancy. Using the collection rates for the base period (1987/88) and domestic and international price indices for the end period (1997/98), we computed nominal rates of protection that are systematically lower than the ones based on the tariff. Using these NRP estimates, as well as the cost data from ASI, we find that export competitiveness was significantly increased and comparative advantage was enhanced in some industries. Resources seem to have moved in the direction of industries endowed with comparative advantage. In a number of industries this has led to increased exports. It is particularly interesting to observe that exports were strongly driven by comparative advantage and their expansion by unit cost decline and productivity growth. Finally, it was also seen that the sector managed to increase its employment base at an average annual rate larger than 2 per cent. This suggests that the reforms, although painful for those workers losing their employment in less successful industries, did not lead to drastic employment loss.
The reasons for these developments are seen in three characteristics of the reforms. First, the fact that trade liberalization was accompanied by currency realignment meant that the potential hardship of increased foreign competition was softened by rising import and export prices. Second, trade liberalization was accompanied by an alleviation of industrial regulation and by the country's opening to foreign investment. Third, the drive for higher efficiency and lower unit costs was facilitated by the increased use of subcontracting, which may have been a way of circumventing the constraints of the existing labour legislation.
Based on these findings, Indian policymakers must be encouraged to pursue further reforms, mainly in the areas of internal regulation of manufacturing activities and the labour market, but also with regard to the remaining structure of protection. Maintaining a well-aligned exchange rate and the encouragement of foreign investments are two further important concerns in future trade and industrial policies.
For analysts and policymakers in other countries the gradual Indian approach and the sequencing of internal and external liberalization, combined with currency realignment, may be of interest as it has strengthened rather than weakend the manufacturing sector.
ANNEX INDICATORS OF COMPETITIVENESS AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
The indicator of competitiveness used in the present study is unit cost ratio (UC), defined as total cost (TC) divided by the value of output (VO), which in turn equals output quantity multiplied by the ex-factory price. For domestic sales, the ex-factory price is the domestic market price (Pd), which is typically higher than the international price of a similar imported product by a margin equal to the nominal rate of protection. For export sales, on the other hand, the ex-factory price is equal to the international (f.o.b.) price (Pw).
This particular definition of the unit cost ratio serves a double purpose. First, it helps to overcome the differences in product mix and quality that make interfirm comparisons always problematic. We assume that the output price is usually proportionate to the quality attributes of the products. Therefore, when two firms have the same total cost, but one produces a higher-quality product with a higher price and total output value, its unit cost ratio would be lower, implying that it is deemed to be more competitive than the other firm. Second, it makes the unit cost indicator independent of the data of an international competitor, whose cost we would otherwise need for comparison. We assume, therefore, that the international price (Pw) corresponds to the unit cost of a typical international best-practice producer. The fact that Pw is measured as the border price (c.i.f.) means that the benchmark for international comparison includes the transport cost to the border and therefore a margin of natural (geographic) protection. Our criterion for international competitiveness or export competitive advantage is as follows:
(1) UCx = TC/(Q Pw) ≤ 1 meaning that a firm is deemed to be competitive if its cost per unit of output is less or equal to the free-trade price of an equivalent import. This concept of cost competitiveness is multilateral, as opposed to a bilateral firm-to-firm or country-tocountry comparison, but it allows bilateral comparison as well. For instance, if UCx A > UCx B > 1, then neither country A nor country B is export competitive, but B is more competitive than A.
Domestic competitiveness, as defined previously, means a cost advantage under protection. In this case the denominator of the unit cost ratio is the output value at domestic prices (VOd = Q Pd), so that the criterion of domestic competitive advantage becomes as follows:
(2) UCd = TC/(Q Pd) ≤ 1
For those firms that export part of their output, Pd of the exported output equals Pw.
In both indicators, UCx and UCd, total cost (TC) includes the interest paid on borrowed capital as well as the opportunity cost of own capital, taken as the capital stock minus outstanding debt multiplied by the market interest rate. UC exceeds unity if the rate of return is lower than the interest rate and it is less than 1 if the rate of return is higher. Clearly, the indicator sets a high standard of competitiveness, because the criterion implies that the firm is able to replace its total capital stock by borrowing at the current interest rate. In times of high interest rates, this may be difficult even for otherwise truly competitive firms. The indicator has, therefore, this long-run characteristic.
However, the most important distinction and the hallmark of our method of analysis is the one between competitiveness and comparative advantage. While competitiveness is understood as a cost advantage based on market prices, including various price distortions, subsidies and penalties, comparative advantage corresponds to a cost advantage at equilibrium prices. In order to measure comparative advantage, we replace all prices, in output as well as all inputs, by shadow prices. A firm or industry has then comparative advantage if the unit cost ratio in terms of shadow prices does not exceed unity:
(3) UCs = TCs/(Q Ps) ≤ 1 where TCs is total cost in shadow prices and Ps is the shadow price of output. For tradable goods, the shadow price is usually equal to the international price (Pw), but adjusted for any distortion of the exchange rate. TCs is the sum of all cost components adjusted for all price distortions and subsidies.
It is now evident that the concept of competitiveness differs from the one of comparative advantage only by including the sum of all price distortions. When UCd is smaller than UCs, the price distortions act as subsidies; when UCd exceeds UCs they act as penalties. Since price distortions affect both inputs and outputs, they have the opposite effect on the cost and output sides. A tariff on output lowers the unit cost ratio (i.e. increases domestic competitiveness), whereas a tariff on tradable inputs raises it and thereby lowers competitiveness. This shows that in the protected domestic market a producer is more competitive than under free trade, as production tends to be more profitable under protection. However, comparative advantage, which is the real core of competitiveness, is not affected by the existing price distortions. However, as a consequence of protection and other distortions, input coefficients at shadow prices may be affected as well. In other words, price distortions may lead to lower efficiency and loss of international competitiveness in the longer run.
Finally, total unit costs net of distortions are broken down into four components, tradable inputs, non-tradable inputs, labour cost and capital cost; the distortions are calculated and added to the unit costs at shadow prices to obtain unit costs at market prices. This leads to the following schema, showing how UCd, UCx and UCs are related to each other: In other words, total unit cost in shadow prices (indicator of comparative advantage), augmented by all cost distortions, adds up to unit cost per output value at free-trade prices (indicator of export competitiveness); adding the output price distortion leads to the unit cost in domestic prices (indicator of domestic competitiveness). This accounting framework enables us to identify, with some limitations, the sources of competitiveness. The distortions are all expressed as proportions of unit costs, so that the highest proportions indicate the strongest influence on unit costs.
